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INTRODUCTION 
In August 2001, the Wisconsin Supreme Court touched off a 
national debate1 by upholding a probation condition placed on a 
man convicted of intentional failure to pay child support.2  The 
probation condition prohibited David W. Oakley from fathering 
children for the term of his probation unless he could prove that he 
was capable of supporting the nine children he had already fathered 
and any additional children he wanted to have.3  The ruling created a 
conflict between child welfare concerns and the fundamental right to 
 
 ∗ J.D. Candidate, Seton Hall University School of Law; M.S. 1997, The 
Pennsylvania State University; B.A. 1994, The College of William and Mary. 
 1 State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).  To see the breadth of coverage 
the case produced, as well as the countervailing policy and legal considerations, see 
Vivian Berger, Bedroom Sentence, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 17, 2001, at A21 (indicating that the 
ruling “illustrates the truth of the hoary maxim that hard cases make bad law”); Joan 
Biskupic, ‘Deadbeat Dad’ Told: No More Kids Wis. Court Backs Threat of Prison, USA 
TODAY, July 11, 2001, at 1A (stating that the decision was “likely to reverberate across 
the USA”); Dennis Chaptman, National Implications Seen in Ruling on Dad: Father of 9’s 
Attorney Considering Taking Case to U.S. Supreme Court, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL, July 12, 
2001, at 2B; Glenda Cooper, Wisconsin Deadbeat Dad Case Tests the Rights to Parenthood, 
WASH. POST, July 15, 2001, at A2 (characterizing the decision as “spark[ing] a 
national furor”); Bruce Fein, Irresponsible Fatherhood, WASH. TIMES, August 07, 2001, at 
A12; Reynolds Holding, The Judicial Sex Police; Stay Out of Our Bedrooms, S.F. CHRON., 
July 22, 2001, at D3; Tamar Lewin, Father Owing Child Support Loses Right to Procreate, 
N.Y. TIMES, July 12, 2001, at A14; Leonard Pitts, Jr., Judge’s Ruling Raises Serious Doubts, 
DAYTON DAILY NEWS, July 18, 2001.  See also Court to Deadbeat Dad: No More Kids, at 
http://www.cbsnews.com/now/story/0,1597,300855-412,00.shtml (July 11, 2001) 
(on file with author); Jennifer Foote Sweeney, Something Cheesy in the State of 
Wisconsin, at http://www.salon.com/mwt/feature/2001/07/13/wisconsin (July 13, 
2001) (on file with author). 
 2 Wisconsin law provides that “[a]ny person who intentionally fails for 120 or 
more consecutive days to provide spousal, grandchild or child support which the 
person knows or reasonably should know the person is legally obligated to provide is 
guilty of a Class E felony.”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 948.22(2) (West 2002).  Although 
Oakley received a five-year probation term, under Wisconsin law a conviction for a 
Class E felony is punishable by “a fine not to exceed $10,000 or imprisonment not to 
exceed 5 years, or both.”  WIS. STAT. ANN. § 939.50(3)(e) (West 2002). 
 3 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201. 
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privacy and procreative control.4  Child welfare advocates view the 
ruling as a victory for children and a mandate for child support 
enforcement.5  In contrast, civil rights advocates, dedicated to 
protecting an individual’s right to control his/her own reproductive 
future, view this type of probation condition as too great an 
infringement on individual constitutional rights.6  Specifically, these 
advocates assert that there are less intrusive/more narrowly tailored 
means to achieve the same important goals.7 
This Comment examines the potential consequences of the 
Oakley decision and argues that, when courts impose probation 
conditions, they may not infringe upon the fundamental right to 
procreate unless that infringement survives strict scrutiny.  Part I of 
this Comment details the foundation and development of the right to 
procreate.  Part II reviews the nature of probation and the difficulty 
of challenging probation conditions.  Part III then examines how, 
and in what circumstances, probation conditions have been used to 
limit procreative rights.  Finally, Part IV discusses the problems 
inherent in the Oakley decision and ultimately concludes that courts 
must invalidate probation conditions that infringe upon the right to 
procreate unless they survive strict scrutiny. 
 
 4 Cooper, supra note 1, at A2 (describing the decision as opening Pandora’s box 
and comparing the viewpoints of representatives from the Association for Children 
for Enforcement of Support and the Wisconsin chapter of the ACLU).  The majority 
and dissenting opinions in Oakley also illustrate the two positions.  The majority 
focused on the impact that failure to pay child support has on children, noting that 
“[r]efusal to pay child support by so-called ‘deadbeat parents’ has fostered a crisis 
with devastating implications for our children” and has produced troubling 
consequences for children such as health and behavioral problems and lower levels 
of educational achievement.  Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 203.  The dissent, however, 
focused on the basic human right to have children, characterizing it as a 
“fundamental liberty which the Constitution jealously guards for all Americans.”  Id. 
at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 5 Cooper, supra note 1, at A2 (quoting Geraldine Jensen, president of the 
Association for Children for Enforcement of Support as stating, “I understand why 
the court had to say no more kids until you support the ones you have. . . .  These 
children are living in poverty.  They have a right to clothing and food.  This is an 
extreme case, but the poor have no excuse not to support their children.  We have to 
make payment of child support as serious as payment of taxes.”). 
 6 Id. (quoting a former chairwoman of the American Bar Association’s Family 
Law Section who characterized the Oakley decision as follows: “‘It gets the state back 
into the bedroom. . . .  [H]ow do you keep from sliding down the slippery slope . . . 
?’”). 
 7 Lewin, supra note 1, at A14 (quoting Julie Sternberg, a lawyer for the American 
Civil Liberties Union as saying, “It’s a very dangerous precedent.  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has said that the right to decide to have a child is one of the most basic human 
rights.  And in this case there were all kinds of less restrictive alternatives.”). 
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I.  THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE 
The United States Supreme Court has recognized the 
fundamental right to procreate for nearly sixty years.  The Court took 
the first step toward affording constitutional protection to the right 
in its 1942 decision, Skinner v. Oklahoma.8  In Skinner, the Court 
identified the right to procreate as “one of the basic civil rights of 
man”9 and invalidated a state statute requiring the sterilization of 
habitual offenders10 as an unconstitutional infringement on that 
right.11  The Court explained that, because “[m]arriage and 
procreation are fundamental to the very existence and survival of the 
race,” forced sterilization of criminal offenders violates the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.12  Additionally, the 
Court required strict scrutiny of governmental attempts to impose 
 
 8 316 U.S. 535 (1942). 
 9 Id. at 541. 
 10 Id. at 536 (defining habitual criminals, under Oklahoma law as, “person[s] 
who, having been convicted two or more times for crimes ‘amounting to felonies 
involving moral turpitude,’ either in an Oklahoma court or in a court of any other 
State, [and] is thereafter convicted of such a felony in Oklahoma and is sentenced to 
a term of imprisonment in an Oklahoma penal institution”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 11 Id. at 537-42.  This ruling was a sharp departure from the Court’s prior 
jurisprudence, most notably, Buck v. Bell where the Court upheld mandatory 
sterilization of the mentally handicapped in state institutions.  274 U.S. 200 (1927).  
In upholding the mandatory sterilization, Justice Holmes wrote his now infamous 
justification, “It is better for the world, if instead of waiting to execute degenerate 
offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society can prevent 
those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. . . .  Three generations of 
imbeciles are enough.”  Id. at 207.  While the Supreme Court did not strike forcible 
sterilization laws until 1942, some lower courts acted earlier.  For example, a federal 
district court judge invalidated a Nevada law allowing for the sterilization of certain 
criminals in 1918.  See Williams v. Smith, 131 N.E. 2 (Ind. 1921) (striking a law 
allowing sterilization of prison inmates); see also Mickle v. Henrichs, 262 F. 687 (D. 
Nev. 1918) (ruling that a Nevada law allowing forced sterilization (vasectomy) of 
some criminals violated the State constitutional prohibition against cruel and 
unusual punishment).  But see LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN 
AMERICAN HISTORY 162-63 (1993) (discussing later Indiana laws allowing sterilization 
of the “feebleminded”). 
 12 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541.  Although the Court ruled on Fourteenth Amendment 
Equal Protection grounds, because the law impermissibly discriminated against 
criminals, commentators still trace the recognition of reproductive control as a 
fundamental right to this decision.  See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL 
LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 657-58 (1997) (indicating that Skinner, by departing 
from the Courts’ previous jurisprudence as established in Buck v. Bell, was the first 
case to recognize the right to procreate); Tracy Ballard, The Norplant Condition: One 
Step Forward or Two Steps Back?, 16 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J. 139, 148 (1993) 
(characterizing Skinner as the “springboard” for case law supporting the right to 
procreate). 
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involuntary sterilization.13 
In 1965, the Court gave further protection to the right to control 
one’s reproductive choices in Griswold v. Connecticut.14  Griswold 
established the fundamental right to privacy for married couples and 
stands as the first of a series of contraceptive cases that built upon 
Skinner to firmly establish procreation as a fundamental right.15  In 
Griswold, the Court invalidated a state law that prohibited dispensing 
information, instruction, or medical advice about contraception to 
 
 13 Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that “strict scrutiny of the classification which a 
State makes in a sterilization law is essential”); see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 
658. 
Courts review legislative enactments with strict scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, 
or rational basis review.  Id. at 529.  Strict scrutiny is the least deferential, most 
exacting review a court applies and requires that the government have compelling 
goals achieved through narrowly tailored means.  See, e.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 
155-56 (1973) (finding that infringements on the fundamental right to privacy will 
only be upheld if the State can demonstrate that the infringement is narrowly 
tailored to achieve a compelling state interest).  Legislative enactments that infringe 
upon a fundamental right or discriminate against a protected class of persons trigger 
strict scrutiny.  See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 529. 
Intermediate scrutiny requires that the government have important goals 
achieved by a substantially related regulation.  See, e.g., Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 
(1976) (invalidating an Oklahoma statute that prohibited sale of a type of beer to 
males under twenty-one and females under eighteen because the statute was not 
substantially related to an important governmental interest).  But see Miss. Univ. for 
Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 724 (1982) (defining intermediate scrutiny as 
requiring the government to have an “exceedingly persuasive justification” for laws 
discriminating on the basis of gender) as an instance in which the Court may actually 
be applying a slightly higher level of scrutiny.  The United States Supreme Court has 
limited the use of intermediate scrutiny to the Equal Protection context.  
CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 529-30. 
Rational basis review is the most deferential, least exacting scrutiny the Court 
applies and requires only that the government’s goals are legitimate and that the 
means chosen are rationally related to those goals.  See, e.g., Ohio Bureau of 
Employment Serv. v. Hodory, 431 U.S. 471, 489 (1977) (applying rational basis where 
the “statute does not involve any discernible fundamental interest or affect with 
particularity any protected class”); Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 
(1976) (noting that rational basis scrutiny is “a relatively relaxed standard reflecting 
the Court’s awareness that the drawing of lines that create distinctions is peculiarly a 
legislative task”).  Rational basis review is the default level of review applied where 
strict or intermediate scrutiny is inappropriate.  CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 533. 
 14 381 U.S. 479 (1965). 
 15 See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 658-62.  Additionally, Griswold has been 
called the “decision that inaugurated the Court’s modern protection of fundamental 
rights under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”  David B. Cruz, 
“The Sexual Freedom Cases”? Contraception, Abortion, Abstinence and the Constitution, 35 
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 299, 299 (2000) (identifying Griswold as the “foundation for a 
series of Supreme Court decisions invalidating anti-contraception and anti-abortion 
laws—cases once referred to by Richard Posner as ‘the sexual freedom cases’”) 
(internal citation omitted). 
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married persons.16  Justice Douglas’s majority opinion relied on the 
Bill of Rights and “emanations from those guarantees” to recognize 
zones of privacy17 that protect the intimate relationship between 
husband, wife, and doctor.18  By recognizing zones of privacy through 
“penumbras” surrounding explicit fundamental rights, the Court 
determined that privacy itself is a fundamental right, even though it is 
not express in the text of the Constitution.19 
While Griswold only protected a married couple’s privacy, six 
years later the Court expanded the privacy right to individuals in 
Eisenstadt v. Baird.20  The Court noted that, for privacy to have any 
meaning, it must extend to individuals.21  Writing for the majority, 
Justice Brennan stated that “[i]f the right of privacy means anything, 
it is the right of the individual, married or single, to be free from 
unwarranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally 
affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.”22  Thus, by 
invalidating a Massachusetts statute prohibiting the distribution of 
 
 16 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 480 (citing a Connecticut law that prohibited persons 
from using “any drug, medicinal article or instrument for the purpose of preventing 
conception,” and allowed for the prosecution of any person who “assists, abets, 
counsels, causes, hires or commands another to commit any offense”).  In Griswold, 
the defendants were the executive director of the Planned Parenthood League of 
Connecticut and its medical director who gave married persons contraceptive 
information and materials.  Id. at 480. 
 17 Id. at 484.  Justice Douglas’s opinion noted that this right of privacy was “older 
than the Bill of Rights—older than our political parties . . . .  Marriage is a coming 
together for better or for worse, hopefully unending, and intimate to the degree of being 
sacred.”  Id. at 486 (emphasis added).  Justice Goldberg’s concurrence echoed this 
position, stating that “[t]he entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that 
clearly underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the rights to marital privacy 
and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and magnitude as the 
fundamental rights specifically protected.”  Id. at 495 (Goldberg, J., concurring). 
 18 Id. at 481-82. 
 19 Id. at 484; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 659.  Justices Black and 
Stewart dissented in Griswold, vigorously asserting that because the right to privacy 
was not express in the text of the Constitution, it was not fundamental.  Griswold, 381 
U.S. at 507-27 (Black, J., dissenting).  Justice Black pointedly noted, “I get nowhere in 
this case by talk about a constitutional ‘right of privacy’ as an emanation from one or 
more constitutional provisions.  I like my privacy as well as the next one, but I am 
nevertheless compelled to admit that government has a right to invade it unless 
prohibited by some specific constitutional provision.”  Id. at 509-10 (Black, J., 
dissenting).  Justice Stewart went so far as to state, “I think this is an uncommonly 
silly law,” while still maintaining that it should be upheld because the Constitution 
did not enumerate privacy as an explicit right.  Id. at 527 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
 20 405 U.S. 438 (1972). 
 21 Id. at 440 (overturning a defendant’s conviction under a law banning 
distribution of contraceptives). 
 22 Id. at 453 (emphasis added). 
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contraceptives to single persons,23 Eisenstadt not only expanded 
privacy rights to individuals, but also anchored procreative control 
within that right.24 
The final case establishing the fundamental right to procreate is 
Carey v. Population Services International, Inc.25  In Carey, the Court 
followed the reasoning of Eisenstadt and expanded the right to 
contraceptive access and information to minors.26  The Court stated, 
“[t]he decision whether or not to beget or bear a child is at the very 
heart of this cluster of constitutionally protected choices [regarding 
family and procreative autonomy/control].”27  Carey also cemented 
the underpinnings of Griswold and Eisenstadt, ensuring, as one 
commentator has written, that Griswold could “no longer be read as 
holding only that a State may not prohibit a married couple’s use of 
contraceptives,” rather, “[r]ead in light of its progeny, the teaching of 
Griswold is that the Constitution protects individual decisions in 
matters of childbearing from unjustified intrusion by the State.”28  
The Court also made it clear that State intrusions are only justified if 
they survive strict scrutiny.29  Justice Brennan’s majority opinion 
stated that, “where a decision as fundamental as that whether to bear 
or beget a child is involved, regulations imposing a burden on it may 
be justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly 
drawn to express only those interests.”30 
Cases addressing the legality of, and access to, abortion have 
further addressed the protection afforded an individual’s decision 
whether or not to become a parent.  In 1973, the Court’s ruling in 
Roe v. Wade31 established a woman’s right to choose to terminate her 
pregnancy.32  In Roe, the Court invalidated a Texas law prohibiting all 
 
 23 The Massachusetts law made it illegal to “sell[], lend[], give[] away, exhibit[] 
or offer[] to sell, lend or give away an instrument or other article intended to be 
used . . . for the prevention of conception” but allowed physicians to “administer or 
prescribe for any married person drugs or articles intended for the prevention of 
pregnancy or conception.”  Id. at 442. 
 24 CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 661. 
 25 431 U.S. 678 (1977). 
 26 Id. at 682; see also Cruz, supra note 15, at 300. 
 27 Carey, 431 U.S. at 685; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 661. 
 28 Cruz, supra note 15, at 310; see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 687 (noting that post-
Griswold decisions make it clear that “the constitutional protection of individual 
autonomy in matters of childbearing” is not based on protecting only the marital 
relationship). 
 29 Carey, 431 U.S. at 685. 
 30 Id. at 686 (internal citations omitted). 
 31 410 U.S. 113 (1973). 
 32 Id. 
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abortions except those necessary to save the life of the mother.33  
Interestingly, the Court no longer found privacy in the penumbras of 
the Bill of Rights as it had earlier in Griswold, but rather found privacy 
protection in the Fourteenth Amendment.34  The Court stated that, 
although the Constitution does not expressly mention the right to 
privacy, such a right has been, and will continue to be, recognized by 
the Court as fundamental and “implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty.”35  The Roe court found that the privacy right is rooted in the 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, and includes not only an individual’s right 
to use contraceptives, but also a woman’s right to terminate a 
pregnancy.36 
While Roe affirmed that the right to privacy includes personal 
reproductive freedom and control, the decision also explicated that 
the right is not absolute.37  Narrowly tailored infringements designed 
to achieve compelling state interests are permissible.38  At least one 
commentator has argued that allowing state infringement on the 
right to privacy indicates that the right is not secure.39  This view, 
however, overstates the case when considered in the wake of the 
entire universe of cases following Roe. 
Although the Court has never defined privacy as an absolute 
right,40 the Court further secured the right to procreate in its 1992 
 
 33 Id. at 164. 
 34 Id. at 153. 
 35 Roe, 410 U.S. at 152. 
 36 Id. at 152, 154; see also CHEMERINSKY, supra note 12, at 664. 
 37 Roe, 410 U.S. at 154. 
 38 Id. at 155-56 (stating that where fundamental rights are implicated, regulation 
is justified only “by a compelling state interest, and that legislative enactments must 
be narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 39 Ballard, supra note 12, at 149-50 (arguing that, in practice, the right to privacy 
is often constrained by an “expanding definition of what constitutes a compelling 
state interest” and that the “occasional evaluation of reproductive rights-burdening 
regulations under a mere rationality standard of review” prevents the right from 
finding “stable footing in our constitutional framework”).  In fact, Ballard suggests 
that there is, in effect, “no substantially established and judicially recognized 
constellation of constitutional rights supportive of the option to have children and to 
control the conditions under which one procreates.”  Id.  Ballard further argues that 
it is this very impermanence and instability that has allowed courts to impose 
Norplant probation conditions on female probationers, conditions that she views as 
invalid infringements upon procreative rights because although temporary, Norplant 
(or Depo-Provera) is still medical sterilization.  Id. 
 40 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 155 (stating that the privacy interest is not absolute, 
and “that at some point the state interests as to protection of health, medical 
standards, and prenatal life, become dominant”); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 326 
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decision, Planned Parenthood v. Casey.41  The six-three decision in Casey 
affirmed the central holding of Roe.  Justice O’Connor’s opinion for 
the majority stated that “[o]ur obligation is to define the liberty of all, 
not to mandate our own moral code.”42  The Court further noted that 
at the core of liberty and, therefore, reproductive freedom, is the 
right of an individual to define his/her “own concept of existence, of 
meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of human life.”43  While 
later limits on Roe raise questions regarding the breadth of the right 
to privacy as it extends to procreative control,44 the mere existence of 
limits on a fundamental right does not mean that the right is in 
danger of being extinguished.  No right is absolute; for example, the 
courts have imposed limits on freedom of speech and yet, the core of 
the right remains.45  Abortion rights are a unique and particularly 
contentious issue in today’s society, yet the Court’s consistent 
protection of the right to procreate more generally highlights the 
right’s stability and importance in constitutional jurisprudence.46 
II.  PROBATION 
Probation is a means by which the criminal justice system can 
impose “supervised, conditional freedom” instead of incarceration on 
convicted criminals.47  Specifically, probation requires that 
probationers comply with conditions that may limit their freedom.48 If 
those conditions are violated, a court may revoke an offender’s 
probation and send him/her to prison.49  How the United States has 
 
(1980) (holding the federal government is not required to fund abortions even when 
medically necessary); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 479 (1977) (ruling that under Roe, 
states can refuse to provide Medicaid funds for non-medically necessary abortions 
even when the state provides Medicaid funding for childbirth). 
 41 505 U.S. 833 (1992); see also Stenberg v. Carhart, 530 U.S. 914 (2000) 
(invalidating a Nebraska law banning partial-birth abortions that did not provide a 
maternal health exception because Casey required that such an exception be 
included). 
 42 Casey, 505 U.S. at 850. 
 43 Id. at 851. 
 44 See supra note 40. 
 45 See, e.g., Turner Broad. Sys. v. Fed. Communication Comm’n, 512 U.S. 622, 
641-43 (1994) (discussing application of strict and intermediate scrutiny to 
regulations of speech); Konigsberg v. State Bar of Cal., 366 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1961) 
(rejecting the position that freedom of speech under the First Amendment is 
“absolute”). 
 46 See supra PART I. 
 47 NEIL P. COHEN, THE LAW OF PROBATION AND PAROLE § 1:2, at 1-7 (2d ed. 1999). 
 48 Id. § 1:1, at 1-3. 
 49 Id. § 1:1, at 1-3, 1-4 (noting that revocation can only occur by holding a 
“judicial revocation proceeding”). 
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implemented its probation system and how this process interacts with 
fundamental rights is as much a study of social policy as it is of the 
law. 
A.  Origin of Probation in the United States 
Surprisingly, the American probationary system began, not with 
a legislative enactment, but with the actions of a cobbler.50  Probation 
in the United States first started when John Augustus convinced the 
Boston Police Court to release a drunk to his custody rather than to 
jail him.51  In his lifetime, Augustus arranged the bail of nearly 2,000 
defendants, and earned the titles of “inventor” and “father” of 
probation.52  Augustus’s ad hoc system ended in 1878 when 
Massachusetts passed the first probation statute; other states and the 
federal government followed suit.53  Today, probation statutes affect 
millions of individuals.54 
B.  Goals of Probation 
The theoretical underpinnings of probation and its goals have 
changed over time.  Probation initially developed as a way to avoid 
the harsh sentences at common law.55  The severity of criminal 
 
 50 ANDREW R. KLEIN, ALTERNATIVE SENTENCING, INTERMEDIATE SANCTIONS AND 
PROBATION 67 (2d ed. 1997).  The development of this informal system of probation 
is even more surprising given the hostility towards Augustus’ work from police and 
court personnel who were only paid if defendants were incarcerated.  Id. 
 51 See id. at 68, 71.  The author notes Augustus’ position as a temperance worker 
who conditioned the defendants’ release on their willingness to take a sobriety 
pledge; if the defendants followed Augustus’ conditions, the cases against them were 
dismissed.  Id. 
 52 Id; see also COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-8. 
 53 See COHEN, supra note 47, at § 1:2, at 1-8, 1-9 (noting that the first federal 
probation statute, Law of Mar. 4, 1925, ch. 521, 43 Stat. 1259, was passed in 1925).  
Today the Federal Sentencing Guidelines govern probation on the federal level.  Id. 
at 1-10; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 162-63. 
 54 See COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-8; see also KLEIN, supra note 50, at 68-69 
(noting that by 1984, 63% of offenders were placed on probation, while 26% were 
incarcerated and 11% were on parole, and further indicating that probation 
caseloads rose 154% from 1980 to 1993).  For examples of these statutes, see 18 
U.S.C. § 3563 (2002).  See also infra note 70.  The most recent data from the Bureau 
of Justice Statistics indicates that on Dec. 31, 2000 there were 3,839,532 persons on 
probation (nearly three times the number of persons in prison) and that 
probationers are predominately men (78%).  United States Department of Justice, 
Bureau of Justice Statistics, National Correctional Population Reaches New High: Grows By 
126,400 During 2000 to Total 6.5 Million Adults, at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/ 
pub/pdf/ppus00.pdf (last visited June 25, 2002) (on file with author). 
 55 See KLEIN, supra note 50, at 71. 
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punishment, influenced by religious and moral determinations,56 
engendered criticism in the mid-eighteenth century, and by the 
middle of the nineteenth century public attention and resources 
finally turned to ameliorating criminal sanctions.57  Probation 
mitigated the severity of sentences and incorporated rehabilitation 
into criminal law.58 
Bolstered by the belief of many commentators that incarceration 
failed to rehabilitate,59 that prisons were overcrowded, and that 
probation was less expensive than imprisonment, the focus on 
probation as a means of rehabilitation continued through the 
1960’s.60  Faith in probation as a means of rehabilitation began to 
decline in the 1970’s, however, when society began to view probation 
as a public threat.61  As society became more fearful of crime and 
what appeared to be increasingly more violent criminals, the 
rationale for rehabilitation lost some of its appeal.62  This shift in 
 
 56 See COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-7. 
 57 Id. § 1:2, at 1-7, 1-8. 
 58 Id § 1:2, at 1-10; see also United States v. Murray, 275 U.S. 347, 357 (1928) 
(noting that the 1925 Federal Probation Act stated that its purpose was to provide 
“an amelioration of the sentence by delaying actual execution or providing a 
suspension so that the stigma might be withheld and an opportunity for reform and 
repentance granted before actual imprisonment should stain the life of the 
convict”); United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d 259, 263 n.5 (9th Cir. 1975) 
(noting that, in five amendments to the Act [through 1972], the rehabilitative goal 
of probation had never been rejected, and, in fact, the amendments seemed to 
emphasize the “rehabilitative theme”). 
 59 See GEORGE  G. KILLINGER & PAUL F. CROMWELL, CORRECTIONS IN THE 
COMMUNITY: ALTERNATIVES TO IMPRISONMENT 168 (1974). 
 60 See Phaedra Athena O’Hara Kelly, Comment, The Ideology of Shame: An Analysis 
of First Amendment and Eighth Amendment Challenges to Scarlet-Letter Probation Conditions, 
77 N.C. L. REV. 783, 841 (1999); see also KILLINGER & CROMWELL, supra note 59, at 45; 
KLEIN, supra note 50, at 71; James C. Weissman, Constitutional Primer on Modern 
Probation Conditions, 8 NEW ENG. J. ON PRISON L. 367, 368-69 (1982) (asserting that 
probation “functions as the prototypical alternative to incarceration for non-violent, 
repetitive conduct”); Jon A. Brilliant, Note, The Modern Day Scarlett Letter: A Critical 
Analysis of Modern Probation Conditions, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1357, 1368-70 (1989) (noting 
that probation is primarily rehabilitative). 
 61 See KLEIN, supra note 50, at 71-72; see also FRIEDMAN, supra note 11, at 404 
(stating that “ [i]n retrospect, the 1950’s and 1960’s represented a peak or high 
point in the movement to make criminal justice more humane, and to tilt the 
balance away from the police and prosecution.  A backlash or reaction then set it.  A 
wave of conservatism swept over the country.  It had its roots in the great fear: the 
fear and hatred of crime.”). 
 62 See COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:1, at 1-2 (characterizing politicians as being 
“enamored with the retribution and vengeance aspects of criminal law while 
simultaneously becoming less enchanted with the rehabilitation aspect of 
penology”).  Cohen also notes that critics of the rehabilitative model argue that 
probation and parole have failed to rehabilitate as an empirical matter.  Id. § 1:23, at 
1-33, 1-34. 
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thinking prompted some states and the federal government to treat 
probation not as an alternative to sentencing, but as a sentence in 
and of itself.63 
The American Bar Association’s (“ABA”) Standards for Criminal 
Justice,64 (“Standards”) illustrates this shift.  In 1970, the Standards 
stated that the goal of probation was to “avoid[] future crimes by 
helping the defendant learn to live productively in the community 
which he has offended against.”65  The Standards further stated that 
this goal was best achieved by “orient[ing] the criminal sanction 
toward the community setting in those cases where it is compatible 
with the other objectives of sentencing.”66  In 1994, however, the 
revised Standards defined “compliance programs” (including 
probation) as sanctions designed to “promote offenders’ future 
compliance with the law,” thus, rejecting the use of the term 
“probation” in order to move away from the traditional definition of 
probation.67  This shift also emphasized the “long-standing ABA 
policy that the legislature should authorize sentences to probation as 
a free-standing sanction.”68  The revision of the Standards indicates 
the ABA’s view that probation is a stand-alone sanction and that 
rehabilitation is no longer the main goal of probation.69 
 
 63 See Kelly, supra note 60, at 844-45; see, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3561 (2002) (defining 
probation as a sentence and explicating when a convicted offender “may be 
sentenced to a term of probation”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11 § 4302 (2001); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 2C:43-2(b) (West 2001); Fonville v. McLaughlin, 270 A.2d 529, 530 (Del. 
1970) (stating that “the imposition of a term of probation constitutes a sentence”). 
 64 ABA, Standards for Criminal Justice, Sentencing §18-3.13, Commentary (3d ed. 
1994) [hereinafter Standards for Criminal Justice]. 
 65 ABA Project on Standards for Criminal Justice, Standards Relating to Probation 1 
(Approved Draft 1970) [hereinafter Approved Draft]. 
 66 Id. 
 67 Standards for Criminal Justice, supra note 65. 
 68 Id. 
 69 See Approved Draft, supra note 65, § 1.2, at 27 (stating that probation is desirable 
in certain cases because: 
(i) it maximizes the liberty of the individual while at the same time 
vindicating the authority of the law and effectively protecting the 
public from further violations of law; 
(ii) it affirmatively promotes the rehabilitation of the offender by 
continuing normal community contracts; 
(iii) it avoids the negative and frequently stultifying effects of confinement 
which often severely and unnecessarily complicate the reintegration of 
the offender into the community; 
(iv) it greatly reduces the financial costs to the public treasury of an 
effective correctional system; 
(v) it minimizes the impact of the conviction upon the innocent 
dependents of the offender). 
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Notwithstanding the ABA’s position, however, many states 
continue to “conceptualize probation as fostering rehabilitation.”70  
What constitutes rehabilitation in the face of social desires to “get 
tough on crime,” however, is less clear.  One commentator has 
described the current political climate as ushering in “[a]n era of 
more creative, experimental probation conditions”71 including the 
harsh and punitive measures of “chemical therapy for sex offenders, 
forced birth control, and . . . castration.”72  The question today is 
whether such experimentation is constitutionally permissible in the 
area of the fundamental right to procreate.73 
 
 70 COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:5, at 1-11 (pointing to the importance of 
maintaining ties to the community and family in order to avoid the “corrupting 
influence” of prison). 
Despite the move away from viewing rehabilitation as the primary goal of 
probation, many states still retain that goal in their statutory language.  See, e.g., ARK. 
CODE ANN. § 5-4-303(a) (Michie 2001); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 4301 (2001); IOWA 
CODE ANN. § 907.6 (West 2001); LA. CODE. CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 895 (West 2001); 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17A, § 1204-2-m (West 2001); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 31-20-6(F) 
(Michie 2001); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 65.10(1) (McKinney 2002); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 
2951.02(C)(1)(a) (Anderson 2002); 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 9754(c)(13) (West 
2002); see also KLEIN, supra note 50, at 72-73 (positing that the continued faith in 
probation as rehabilitation stems from a belief that the administration of the system 
is problematic, not probation itself, noting that, in 1988, probation received only 
three cents to every dollar spent on corrections); Kelly, supra note 60, at 843 (noting 
that “because of a lack of funding and support staff, probation as a method of 
rehabilitation has not been nearly as effective” as hoped). 
 71 Kelly, supra note 60, at 784.  This characterization of probation conditions 
taking on an “experimental” quality raises questions as to whether state 
experimentation with probation conditions is permissible when the conditions 
implicate fundamental rights.  Id.  Justice Goldberg provided an insightful 
perspective on this issue in his concurring opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut: 
The entire fabric of the Constitution and the purposes that clearly 
underlie its specific guarantees demonstrate that the right to marital 
privacy and to marry and raise a family are of similar order and 
magnitude as the fundamental rights specifically protected. 
      . . . . 
      . . . “[A] . . . State may . . . serve as a laboratory; and try novel social 
and economic experiments, I do not believe that this includes the 
power to experiment with the fundamental liberties of citizens . . . .”  
The vice of the dissenters’ views is that it would permit such 
experimentation by the States in the area of the fundamental personal 
rights of its citizens.  I cannot agree that the Constitution grants such 
power either to the States or to the Federal Government. 
381 U.S. 479, 495-96 (1965) (internal citations omitted). 
 72 Kelly, supra note 60, at 784. 
 73 COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:22, at 1-32 (noting that recent concerns about the 
developments in the underlying theoretical foundation of probation are driven not 
only by reduced confidence in rehabilitation, but also by skepticism regarding the 
“vast discretion accorded those people who implement it”).  Cohen raises additional 
concerns that the system itself is one “where arbitrariness and capriciousness are 
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C.  Probation Statutes 
Probationary goals, whether punitive or remedial, are entirely 
statutory.74  Overall, the structure of state and federal probation 
statutes is remarkably similar.75  These statutes impose restrictions on 
the freedom of an individual who has been convicted of a crime.76  
These statutory restrictions, commonly called “conditions,” generally 
take one of three forms.77  The first type of statute gives the 
sentencing court great latitude to impose appropriate restrictions by 
offering few specific suggestions of probation conditions and grants 
the court nearly unlimited discretion.78  The second type requires the 
sentencing court to apply certain mandatory conditions but then 
confers upon the court the power to impose other necessary and 
appropriate conditions.79  The third type, and the clear trend in 
probation, lists detailed, specific conditions that the court may (but is 
not required to) impose and also grants courts the authority to 
impose other reasonable conditions, usually through a “catch-all” 
provision.80 
Mandatory or suggested conditions often include restrictions 
such as a prohibition against re-offending during the probationary 
term, remaining within the jurisdiction, and reporting to probation 
officers.81  Violation of any of these conditions results in the 
 
possible and very difficult to detect.”  Id.§ 1:24, at 1-34. 
 74 See COHEN, supra note 47, § 2:1, at 2-3; see also Ex parte United States, 242 U.S. 
27, 37 (1916) (noting there is no constitutional right to probation); United States v. 
Mele, 117 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 1997) (identifying the power to grant probation as solely 
rooted in statutes); United States v. Belgard, 894 F.2d 1092 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating 
that there is no constitutional right to probation). 
 75 See Klein, supra note 50, at 77-80 (discussing the similarity of statutes across 
jurisdictions and giving examples of the structure and provisions of those statutes). 
 76 COHEN, supra note 47, § 7:13, at 7-22. 
 77 Id. 
 78 Id.  See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 279, § 1A (West 2002) (allowing the 
court to “place [an offender] on probation for such time and on such terms and 
conditions as it shall fix”). 
 79 Id.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S § 3563 (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
 80 COHEN, supra note 47, § 7:12, at 7-23.  See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 948.03 (West 
2002). 
 81 KLEIN, supra note 50, at 77-78.  Klein characterizes the common statutory 
conditions as follows: 
First, probationers must obey all laws.  Second, they must report 
periodically to their probation officer.  Third, they must obey all court 
orders, including payment of court-ordered fines, costs, fees, 
restitution, support and other financial assessments.  Fourth, they must 
remain within the jurisdiction of the court.  Fifth, they must participate 
in and often pay for proscribed treatment. 
Id.  The author additionally notes that other conditions are increasingly being 
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termination of probation and the incarceration of the offender.82  
This “laundry list”83 of conditions may then be supplemented by 
discretionary “special conditions”84 imposed in light of the particular 
facts of a case.85  Indeed, legislatures have granted judges such 
extraordinary discretion to impose appropriate conditions that one 
commentator has noted that special conditions are “limited only by 
the sentencing judge’s imagination.”86  These special conditions have 
ranged from so-called “scarlet letter provisions”87 which require overt 
actions by the probationer to inform the public that s/he has been 
convicted of a crime88 to less overt restrictions such as making 
donations to specific organizations,89 refraining from associating with 
 
included as mandatory provisions, such as community service, jail terms as a 
condition of probation, searches or testing, or prohibitions from owning firearms.  
Id.  See, e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 3563(a) (Law. Co-op. 2002). 
 82 COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:2, at 1-7. 
 83 Brilliant, supra note 60, at 1367. 
 84 KLEIN, supra note 50, at 80-88 (noting that a sentencing judge’s discretion, 
while not total, is very broad and will be given discretion by appellate courts).  See, 
e.g., 18 U.S.C.S. § 3563(b) (Law. Co-op. 2002) (giving courts the ability to impose 
discretionary conditions by explicating twenty-one optional conditions including 
restitution, support of dependents, required employment, medical or psychological 
treatment, and also including a catch-all category through which the courts may 
require a defendant to “satisfy such other conditions as the court may impose”). 
 85 COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:10, at 1-16. 
 86 Kelly McMurry, For Shame: Paying for Crime Without Serving Time, But with a Dose 
of Humility, TRIAL, May 1997, at 12. 
 87 United States v. William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d 911, 912-15 (8th Cir. 1982) 
(noting disapproval of “scarlet letter” terms of probation).  See generally Kelly, supra 
note 60 (analyzing the validity of such conditions and recommending improvements 
on current approaches); Brilliant, supra note 60 (providing a broad analysis and 
critique of scarlet-letter probation conditions). 
 88 See, e.g., People v. Hackler, 16 Cal. Rptr. 2d 681, 682 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) 
(requiring a convicted felon to wear a t-shirt with “My record plus two six-packs 
equals four years” printed on the front and, “I am on felony probation for theft” 
printed on the back); People v. McDowell, 130 Cal. Rptr. 839, 842 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1976) (overruled on other grounds by People v. Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 808 (Cal. 
1993)) (forcing petitioner, a convicted purse snatcher, to wear tap shoes when 
leaving his house); Lindsey v. State, 606 So. 2d 652 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1992) 
(requiring probationer to take out an ad in a newspaper which had his mug shot and 
the caption “DUI—Convicted”); Ballenger v. State, 436 S.E.2d 793, 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1993) (forcing man to wear a pink fluorescent bracelet with “DUI Convict” on it); 
People v. Meyer, 680 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Ill. 1997) (imposing the condition that a man 
convicted of aggravated battery place signs at all entrances to his farm which stated 
“Warning! A Violent Felon lives here.  Enter at your own risk!”); People v. 
Letterlough, 655 N.E.2d 146, 147 (N.Y. 1995) (striking down a probation condition 
requiring a convicted DWI offender to place a fluorescent bumper sticker stating 
“Convicted DWI” on his car); State v. Bateman, 771 P.2d 314, 316 (Or. Ct. App. 
1989) (en banc) (forcing a man convicted of sexual abuse to put a sign at his home 
and on his car for 5 years that read “Dangerous Sex Offender”). 
 89 See, e.g., William Anderson Co., 698 F.2d at 912-915 (allowing a corporate 
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certain persons/groups,90 or from engaging in certain activities.91  
Restrictions preventing probationers from engaging in certain 
activities have led to challenges in the area of reproductive rights; 
specifically, individuals have challenged conditions that prohibit 
them from conceiving and bearing children during their 
probationary terms as violative of the fundamental right to 
procreate.92 
D.  Challenges to Probation Conditions 
1.  Obstacles to Challenges of Probation Conditions 
Although there have been numerous critiques of probation 
conditions, challenges to these restrictions have been largely 
unsuccessful.93  Courts rely on various theories to reject probation 
challenges, including (1) the “act of grace doctrine” and (2) the 
contract, or waiver, doctrine.94  The United States Supreme Court first 
articulated the act of grace doctrine in Escoe v. Zerbst.95  In Escoe, the 
Court stated, “probation or suspension of sentence comes as an act of 
grace to one convicted of a crime, and may be coupled with such 
conditions in respect of its duration as Congress may impose.”96  
Thus, probation was viewed as a privilege that could be taken away at 
the discretion of the trial court and that should be accepted 
 
defendant to pay a fine to a charitable organization where corporate officers were 
doing community service); People v. Burleigh, 727 P.2d 873, 874 (Colo. Ct. App. 
1986) (requiring probationer to make charitable contribution to a drug treatment 
program); State v. Pieger, 692 A.2d 1273, 1274 (Conn. 1997) (forcing probationer to 
make a donation to a local hospital). 
 90 See, e.g., United States v. Showalter, 933 F.2d 573, 574-76 (7th Cir. 1991) 
(prohibiting probationer from associating with skinhead or neo-Nazi organizations); 
United States v. Kohlberg, 472 F.2d 1189, 1190 (9th Cir. 1973) (prohibiting 
probationer from association with “known homosexuals”). 
 91 See, e.g., People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290, 292 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) 
(prohibiting a female offender from living with “any man to whom [she was] not 
married” and from becoming pregnant until after she was married). 
 92 See infra notes 151-64 and accompanying text. 
 93 COHEN, supra note 47, § 1:10, at 1-16.  Of perhaps equal importance, however, 
is that few conditions are ever challenged.  See Horwitz, infra note 99, at 81-84. 
 94 Kelly, supra note 60, at 839-40 (identifying act of grace and contract theories as 
the “[t]raditional justifications for not allowing probationers to challenge their 
probation conditions”); see also COHEN, supra note 47, § 7:1, at 7-3; Jeffrey N. Hurwitz, 
House Arrest: A Critical Analysis of an Intermediate-Level Penal Sanction, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 
771, 791-92 (1987). 
 95 295 U.S. 490 (1934).  Two years earlier, in Burns v. United States, the Court 
alluded to its understanding of probation as a beneficent grant when it characterized 
probation as a privilege, not a right.  287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932). 
 96 Escoe, 295 U.S. at 492-93. 
 462 SETON HALL LAW REVIEW Vol. 33:447 
thankfully by the probationer.97  In 1973, however, the Supreme 
Court explicitly rejected the act of grace doctrine in Gagnon v. 
Scarpelli,98 finding that “a probationer can no longer be denied due 
process, in reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst, that probation is 
an ‘act of grace.’”99  As one commentator has noted, “probationers do 
in fact have constitutionally protected rights that can neither be 
bartered away to the state for greater lenience in sentencing nor 
compromised in accordance with a restrictive act of grace theory.”100 
Courts have also used the contract (or waiver) doctrine to reject 
challenges to probation conditions.  The contract doctrine views 
probation as a contract between the probationer and the court in 
which the probationer agrees to abide by specific conditions and the 
court agrees not to incarcerate the probationer so long as the 
conditions are followed.101  Under this doctrine, the probationer is 
deemed to have waived any right to challenge the bargain into which 
s/he entered; however, in 1932, the Supreme Court expressly stated 
 
 97 See Kelly, supra note 60, at 840; see also People v. Osslo, 323 P.2d 397 (Cal. 1958) 
(finding that there is no constitutional right to rehabilitation so there is no right to 
be put on probation rather than to be incarcerated).  At least one court has also 
indicated that the act of grace doctrine subsumes a constructive custody theory which 
“suggests that since the convicted criminal might have been sentenced to prison 
instead of being placed on probation . . . [s/he] may be considered as living in a 
‘prison without walls,’ subject to the same restrictions . . . as any other prisoner.  Any 
departure from these restrictions should be viewed as a matter of grace, not one of 
right.” Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 273-74. 
 98 411 U.S. 778 (1973). 
 99 Gagnon, 411 U.S. at 782 n.4.  For additional decisions eroding the doctrine, see 
Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 482 (1971) (granting Fourteenth Amendment 
protections to the liberty interests of parolees); Mempa v. Ray, 389 U.S. 128, 136 
(1967) (granting the Sixth Amendment right to counsel where sentencing occurs 
after a probation revocation); United States v. Pastore, 537 F.2d 675, 681 (2d Cir. 
1976) (granting procedural protections to an attorney convicted of filing a false tax 
return).  For commentary discussing the theoretical problems inherent in relying on 
the act of grace doctrine, see Ballard, supra note 12, at 184 (noting the doctrine’s 
rejection by the judiciary); Andrew Horwitz, Coercion, Pop-Psychology, and Judicial 
Moralizing: Some Proposals for Curbing Judicial Abuse of Probation Conditions, 57 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 75, 88-90 (2000) (noting that the doctrine is highly criticized by scholars, 
yet recognizing that it is still used to deny review to probation challenges).  Some 
commentators have suggested that the view of probation as a privilege has fueled the 
courts’ reluctance to hear Eighth Amendment challenges to special probation 
conditions.  See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 60, at 839. 
 100 Hurwitz, supra note 94, at 792; see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 7.01 cmt. at 225 
(1985) (characterizing the act of grace theory as “out of date and unrealistic,” 
arguing that probation is not imposed as a matter of grace but rather because both 
“common sense” and research indicate “that it is better to maintain the offender in 
the environment in which he must eventually learn to live” rather than to incarcerate 
him). 
 101 See Kelly, supra note 60, at 839. 
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that probation is not a contract and  probationers “cannot insist on 
terms or strike a bargain.”102  Additionally, critics have noted that the 
“significant pressure” exerted by the threat of incarceration 
undermines the voluntary nature of a convict’s acceptance of the 
conditions.103 
Although the Supreme Court has expressly rejected, and 
commentators have sharply criticized both the act of grace and the 
contract/waiver doctrines, both doctrines still retain some 
influence.104  Recent decisions continue to rely on both doctrines.105  
For example, a 1998 Indiana decision, Morgan v. State,106 characterized 
 
 102 Burns v. United States, 287 U.S. 216, 220 (1932) (adopting instead the act of 
grace doctrine to uphold a probation condition); see also Roberts v. United States, 
320 U.S. 264, 274 (1943) (stating that probation is not “a kind of bargain”) 
(Frankfurter, J., dissenting); Hahn v. Burke, 430 F.2d 100, 104 (7th Cir. 1970) 
(“Probation is in fact not a contract.  The probationer does not enter into agreement 
on an equal status with the state.”); United States v. Birnbaum, 402 F.2d 24, 29 (2d 
Cir. 1968) (stating that probation is not a contract); Consuelo-Gonzalez, 521 F.2d at 
265 n.15 (explaining that the Supreme Court had rejected contract theory in the 
parole context in Morrissey v. Brewer, therefore, the Ninth Circuit believed “that the 
custody and contract theories are equally inappropriate when applied in the 
probation setting”) (internal citation omitted); Kelly, supra note 60, at 840; Bruce D. 
Greenberg, Probation Conditions and the First Amendment: When Reasonableness is Not 
Enough, 17 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 45, 59 (1981); Note, Judicial Review of Probation 
Conditions, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 181, 188-90 (1967) [hereinafter Judicial Review] (noting 
that “[i]t requires no sophisticated analysis to demonstrate that the acceptance of 
probation by the offender bears little resemblance to a contract” given that neither 
“release from custody” nor the offenders agreement to the conditions are “mutually 
bargained for,” and additionally noting that the form of “offer” and acceptance is 
merely a formality used “primarily for the purpose of ascertaining whether the 
offender intends to abide by the condition” in order to avoid “the necessity of a later 
revocation proceeding” if the offender intends not to comply); Sunny A.M. Koshy, 
Note, The Right of the People to be Secure: Extending Fundamental Fourth Amendment Rights 
to Probationers and Parolees, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 449, 466-67 (1988) (noting that wavier of 
one’s rights is only valid when “made voluntarily and in the ‘totality of the 
circumstances’” and that the threat of incarceration undermines the “voluntariness” 
of agreement to probation conditions) (internal citation omitted). 
 103 Greenberg, supra note 102, at 57. 
 104 Kelly, supra note 60, at 838. 
 105 See, e.g., State v. Donovan, 568 P.2d 1107, 1110 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977) (noting 
that “probation is a matter of legislative grace”) (internal citation omitted); People v. 
Welch, 851 P.2d 802, 810 (Cal. 1993) (adopting the waiver theory to reject a 
probation challenge); People v. Bacon, 587 N.E.2d 606, 608 (Ill. App. Ct. 1992) 
(stating that “a sentence of probation is a matter of judicial grace”); State v. Macy, 
403 N.W.2d 743, 745 (S.D. 1987) (rejecting defendant’s probation challenge because 
he “chose probation but now challenges what he voluntarily accepted”); State v. 
Bonestel, 871 S.W.2d 163, 169 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1993) (describing probation as an 
“act of grace”); State v. Martin, 472 S.E.2d 822, 824 (W. Va. 1996) (defining 
probation as a “matter of grace”). 
 106 691 N.E.2d 466 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998). 
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the imposition of probation as a “matter of grace.”107  Commentators 
also have noted the continued use of both doctrines, observing that 
“though the act of grace doctrine is ‘thoroughly discredited,’ courts 
continue ritualistically to mouth it,”108 and that regardless of whether 
the acceptance of probation conditions actually constitutes a valid 
contract, courts still refer to probation as such.109  The continued use 
of both highly criticized doctrines is troubling and will be discussed 
later in this Comment in light of the recent decision in Oakley. 
2.  Tests Applied to Review Probation Conditions 
Despite these philosophical obstacles, courts still hear challenges 
to probation conditions and must apply some test to review those 
conditions.  The myriad of tests applied is nothing short of a “chaotic 
hodgepodge.”110  In the broadest sense, the tests for review of 
conditions fall into two categories: (1) relatively deferential tests 
which evaluate the reasonableness of the condition (generally 
applied to statutory challenges),111 and (2) tests involving some 
heightened level of scrutiny when a condition implicates a 
constitutional right (also called “unconstitutional conditions” tests).112  
This Comment will look briefly at each approach in turn and then 
suggest that courts must review probation conditions implicating the 
fundamental right to procreate with strict scrutiny. 
a.  Reasonableness Tests 
Courts applying a review based on reasonableness examine 
probation conditions to “ensure that [they] further[] the implicit or 
explicit statutory goals of probation” and that those conditions fall 
within those that could be used generally as a sanction against 
criminal defendants.113  This review may be applied not only to 
conditions that do not implicate constitutional rights, but also to 
those that do.114  Courts adopting this type of review have further 
refined it by formulating two alternative/separate subtests: (1) 
 
 107 Id. at 468. 
 108 See, e.g., Greenberg, supra note 102, at 56. 
 109 See, e.g., Comment, Rights of the Maryland Probationer: A Primer for the Probationer, 
11 U. BALT. L. REV. 272, 274 n.14 (1982). 
 110 Kelly, supra note 60, at 838. 
 111 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 90. 
 112 Id. 
 113 Brilliant, supra note 60, at 1373; see also Horwitz, supra note 99, at 90 (noting 
that these challenges seem to engender less confusion and more consensus 
regarding the appropriate standard of review than do constitutional challenges). 
 114 See infra note 127. 
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reasonableness, and (2) reasonable relation.115 
A reasonableness test is the most deferential review, as it requires 
only that conditions be reasonable; the convicted criminal must be 
able to follow them and they cannot be excessive, vague, or illegal.116  
Appellate courts applying this approach generally review conditions 
under a very deferential “abuse of discretion” standard, which in turn 
means that appellate courts very rarely invalidate challenged 
conditions.117 
A reasonable relation standard entails the only slightly more 
exacting requirement that conditions be reasonably related to the 
underlying goals of probation.118  This test produces wide-ranging 
results because the underlying goals of probation vary from state to 
state.119  Reasonable relation is the level of review adopted by the 
Federal Sentencing Guidelines.120  Two California state court 
decisions, People v. Dominguez121 and People v. Lent,122 articulate a well-
 
 115 Kelly, supra note 60, at 846-61. 
 116 Id. at 847.  See, e.g., Pastore, 537 F.2d at 683 (invalidating a probation condition 
prohibiting an attorney from practicing law as “improper”); Sweeney v. United 
States, 353 F.2d 10, 11 (7th Cir. 1965) (invalidating as unreasonable a probation 
condition prohibiting an alcoholic from drinking); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 
411 (S.C. 1985) (invalidating a probation condition requiring castration of 
defendant as illegal); State v. Macy, 403 N.W.2d 743, 744 (S.D. 1987) (characterizing 
the test as “one of reasonableness”); State v. Barklind, 532 P.2d 633, 637 (Wash. Ct. 
App. 1975) (applying reasonableness test to determine the “propriety of a condition 
of probation”); Williams v. State, 523 S.W.2d 953, 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1975) 
(invalidating a probation condition as “vague and indefinite” where defendant was 
prohibited from “‘reenter[ing] without written permission from this Court.’”); 
People v. Baum, 231 N.W. 95 (Mich. 1930) (invalidating a condition of probation 
requiring defendant to leave the state for the five year term of probation because it 
contravened public policy by encouraging states to dump convicted criminals into 
other states). 
 117 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 90-91; see also id. at 78 (observing that the “general 
rule appears to be that if the appellate court cannot categorically describe the 
probation condition as irrational, the condition survives”); COHEN, supra note 47, § 
7:32, at 7-58 (stating that “most probation and parole conditions are upheld”). 
 118 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 92-93. 
 119 Id. (observing that although the “majority of states” view rehabilitation as the 
primary goal of probation, courts have required that the condition be related to 
additional goals such as public safety, deterrence, retribution and future criminality). 
 120 U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5B1.3(b) (2001).  The overarching 
purpose of the guidelines is to “prescribe appropriate sentences for offenders 
convicted of federal crimes,” and included in the guidelines are provisions for 
probation.  Id. at Introduction.  See, e.g., United States v. Schiff, 876 F.2d 272, 274 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (stating that under the federal probation regime, probation conditions 
need only be “reasonably related to the simultaneous goals of rehabilitating the 
defendant and protecting the public”) (internal citations omitted). 
 121 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal Ct. App. 1967). 
 122 541 P.2d 545, 548 (Cal. 1975). 
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known reasonable relation test.  The test developed in these two cases 
is commonly known as the Dominguez-Lent test.123  Under the 
Dominguez-Lent test, a probation condition is invalid if it “(1) has no 
relationship to the crime of which the offender was convicted, (2) 
relates to conduct which is not in itself criminal, and (3) requires or 
forbids conduct which is not reasonably related to future 
criminality.”124  This test has been widely adopted, leading 
commentators to characterize California as being “at the forefront of 
developing standards for analyzing probation conditions.”125  One 
commentator has astutely noted, however, that the ultimate result of 
reasonableness or reasonable relation tests is an “extraordinarily 
deferential” review.126 
b.  Unconstitutional Condition Tests 
While many courts apply a reasonableness or reasonable relation 
test to any and all probation conditions,127 some courts adopt a more 
 
 123 See Kelly, supra note 60, at 848. 
 124 Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. at 293 (invalidating a probation condition, which 
prohibited a convicted robber from becoming pregnant unless she was married, as 
unrelated to robbery and further noting that “[c]ontraceptive failure is not an 
idicium of criminality”).  For cases outside of the California Court of Appeals 
applying the Dominguez standard, see Lent, 541 P.2d at 548; Rodriguez v. State, 378 
So. 2d 7, 9 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335, 1337 n.2 
(Ohio Ct. App. 1976). 
 125 See, e.g., Kelly, supra note 60, at n.545 (noting that Dominguez shows California’s 
leading position at the state level in probation condition analysis, while Consuelo-
Gonzales shows its leadership at the federal level). 
 126 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 94-95 (noting, however, that the review does have 
“enough teeth in it to enable a court to overturn a condition that it finds offensive or 
troubling”). 
 127 See, e.g., Schiff, 876 F.2d at 274 (stating that under the federal probation 
regime, probation conditions need only be “‘reasonably related to the simultaneous 
goals of rehabilitating the defendant and protecting the public’”) (internal citations 
omitted); Brumley v. Simmons, No. 97-3161-DES, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8160, at *9 
(D. Kan. May 26, 2000) (finding that “[p]robation conditions which restrict 
constitutional rights such as the right of association . . . must bear a reasonable 
relationship to the rehabilitation of the accused and the protection of the public”); 
Commonwealth v. Pike, 701 N.E.2d 951, 959-60 (Mass. 1998) (noting that courts 
have great flexibility in crafting probation conditions and that conditions that restrict 
constitutional rights must only be “‘reasonably related’ to the goals of sentencing 
and probation”); State v. Bolt, 984 P.2d 1181 (Colo. Ct. App. 1999) (upholding 
probation conditions limiting the probationer’s freedom of association where the 
conditions were “not punitive and are reasonably related to the purposes of 
probation”); State v. Schertz, No. 99-1516-CR, 1999 Wisc. App. LEXIS 1392, at *15-16 
(Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 23, 1999) (noting the broad ability of sentencing courts to 
impose reasonable conditions and allowing that “conditions may impinge on 
constitutional rights as long as they are not overly broad and are reasonably related 
to the defendant’s rehabilitation”). 
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searching review where conditions implicate constitutional rights.128  
As mentioned above, prior adherence to the act of grace and contract 
theories has limited the ability of probationers to challenge their 
conditions as unconstitutional.129  However, some courts are more 
receptive to constitutional challenges now that these two doctrines 
have been discredited.130 
In United States v. Consuelo-Gonzalez,131 the Ninth Circuit 
articulated a heightened scrutiny for probation conditions that 
implicate constitutional rights.  In Consuelo-Gonzalez, the court 
indicated that while it would uphold probation conditions that 
infringed upon fundamental rights, it would only do so if that 
condition survived “special scrutiny.”132  This special scrutiny consisted 
of a three-part review examining “the purposes sought to be served by 
probation, the extent to which the full constitutional guarantees 
available to those not under probation should be accorded 
probationers, and the legitimate needs of law enforcement.”133  The 
Ninth Circuit later clarified the test in Higdon v. United States.134  The 
Higdon court explained that this “special scrutiny” consisted of a two-
step test: first, the court must examine the purpose for the imposition 
of the condition and second, provided the purpose is permissible, the 
court must “determine whether the conditions are reasonably related 
to that purpose.”135  This reformulation appears to render this 
“special scrutiny” as little more than a reasonableness analysis,136 
 
 128 See Kelly, supra note 60, at 849; see also infra notes 130-36 and accompanying 
text. 
 129 Brilliant, supra note 60, at 1376; see also Development in Law: Alternatives to 
Incarceration, 111 HARV. L. REV. 1944, 1950 (1988) [hereinafter Alternatives to 
Incarceration] (noting that reliance on the “act of grace” and contract doctrines had 
limited constitutional challenges to probation conditions such that “[o]ffenders have 
enjoyed greater success when arguing that their probation conditions are not 
reasonably related to the purposes of probation”). 
 130 See Brilliant, supra note 60 at 1376; see also United States v. Workman, 585 F.2d 
1205 (4th Cir. 1978) (upholding a Fourth Amendment challenge to the use of 
evidence obtained by a warrantless search of probationer’s home in a probation 
revocation hearing); Porth v. Templar, 453 F.2d 330 (10th Cir. 1971) (upholding a 
First Amendment challenge to a probation condition prohibiting defendant from 
speaking about and questioning the constitutionality of tax laws). 
 131 521 F.2d 259 (9th Cir. 1975). 
 132 Id. at 265.  The court also categorically rejected the position that the 
contract/waiver doctrine would be an acceptable reason to side-step this review.  Id. 
 133 Id. at 262. 
 134 627 F.2d 893 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Kelly, supra note 60, at 849. 
 135 Higdon, 627 F.2d at 897. 
 136 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 99-101 (commenting that even when courts claim to 
apply some heightened review, the scrutiny afforded probation conditions is rarely 
more than a “variant on the ‘reasonableness’ test”). 
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particularly given the deference that appellate courts adopting this 
test have continued to show sentencing courts.137  Commentators have 
also criticized the test for providing little guidance for appellate 
courts, particularly regarding the extent to which probationers are 
afforded constitutional rights.138 
c.  Choosing the Appropriate Standard of Review 
Having two separate levels of review for probation conditions 
gives appropriate deference to the courts to impose suitable 
conditions to achieve probationary goals.  Where conditions do not 
implicate constitutional rights, appellate courts defer to the 
sentencing court’s determination of reasonable restrictions.139  In 
contrast, when conditions infringe upon a fundamental right such as 
those that prohibit a probationer from conceiving or bearing 
children for the term of his/her probation, courts should apply a 
heightened scrutiny.140  However, a review of probation conditions 
that implicate fundamental rights must be more exacting than a 
reasonableness test with a new label.141  Review of constitutional 
challenges to probation conditions must prevent inappropriate 
encroachment on fundamental rights, particularly where those 
infringements are based on “pop-psychology, personal values and 
morality and various degrees of bias and prejudice.”142  Without a 
stringent and coherent level of scrutiny for constitutionally-based 
probation challenges, the criminal justice system allows trial courts 
nearly unbridled discretion to limit all fundamental rights, including 
not only privacy and procreative rights, but also freedom of speech,143 
freedom of association,144 and freedom of religion.145 
 
 137 See, e.g., Owens v. Kelly, 681 F.2d 1362, 1366 (11th Cir. 1982); United States v. 
Tonry, 605 F.2d 144, 150 (5th Cir. 1979); State v. Smith, 540 A.2d 679, 689 (Conn. 
1988); Patton v. State, 580 N.E.2d 693, 698 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991); see also Horwitz, 
supra note 99, at 102. 
 138 See, e.g., Horwitz, supra note 99, at 102. 
 139 Id. at 90-91. 
 140 Id. at 157. 
 141 Id. at 110. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. at 110-13 (citing People v. King, 73 Cal. Rptr. 440, 448 (Cal Ct. App. 1968) 
(upholding a condition that precluded probationer from, among other things, 
“making speeches” in anti-war demonstrations)). 
 144 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 118-24 (noting that the courts have “trampled upon 
and virtually disregarded the right of a defendant to freedom of association perhaps 
more than any other cherished constitutional right” and that appellate courts are 
“particularly deferential” in this area). 
 145 Id. at 132-36; see also Malone v. United States, 502 F.2d 554, 555 (2d Cir. 1974) 
(upholding a condition prohibiting probationer from participating in “any Irish 
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To this end, courts should apply strict scrutiny to probation 
conditions that implicate fundamental rights.146  To do otherwise 
would run contrary to an extensive history of Supreme Court rulings 
that require strict scrutiny for state abridgement of fundamental 
liberties.147  As Justice Goldberg wrote in his concurring opinion in 
Griswold v. Connecticut, 
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where 
fundamental personal liberties are involved, they may not be 
abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory 
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a 
proper state purpose.  “Where there is a significant encroachment 
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a 
subordinating interest which is compelling.”  The law must be 
shown “necessary, and not merely rationally related, to the 
accomplishment of a permissible state policy.”148 
While Justice Goldberg was addressing regulation of contraceptives 
and not criminal sanctions such as probation, the same high level of 
scrutiny should be afforded probationers.  The Supreme Court has 
given constitutional protection to the right to procreate for nearly 
sixty years and strict scrutiny appropriately protects this fundamental 
right while still affording courts discretion to craft and impose 
probation conditions.  Additionally, strict scrutiny provides a 
coherent and consistent test for all courts to apply and minimizes 
discrepancies between courts.149  Courts have already applied strict 
scrutiny to strike down criminal sentences imposing permanent 
sterilization or castration on offenders;150 probationers should receive 
 
Catholic organizations or groups”). 
 146 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 157-58. 
 147 Infringement upon a fundamental right or discrimination against a protected 
group triggers strict scrutiny, which requires that a statute be narrowly tailored to 
achieve a compelling governmental interest.  See United States v. Carolene Prod., 304 
U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938) (suggesting, for the first time, a higher level of scrutiny for 
laws that infringe on fundamental rights or discriminate against certain groups).  
Compare Williamson v. Lee Optical, 348 U.S. 483, 488 (1955) (emphasizing the need 
for judicial deference to legislative decisions by applying rational basis review even 
when the Court might view the law as “unwise, improvident, or out of harmony with a 
particular school of thought”), with Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 154-56 (1973) 
(finding that fundamental privacy rights include the right to terminate pregnancy, 
yet infringement on that right may be upheld if the infringement is narrowly tailored 
to achieve a compelling state interest). 
 148 Griswold, 381 U.S. at 497 (Goldberg, J., concurring) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 149 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 157-58. 
 150 See, e.g., Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541-43 (1942) (invalidating the 
Oklahoma Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act, which required forced sterilization 
after a third felony conviction involving “moral turpitude,” as an invalid 
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similar protection for their procreative rights. 
III.  INFRINGEMENTS ON THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO PROCREATE 
Trial judges have vast discretion to impose probation conditions, 
so much so that judges have intruded on probationers’ fundamental 
right to privacy with “alarming frequency.”151  Conditions preventing 
probationers from having children have taken a variety of forms 
including permanent sterilization, forced birth control, and general 
prohibitions against having children.152  While rulings imposing 
permanent/surgical sterilization or castration as part of a criminal 
sentence or probation have consistently been struck down as 
unconstitutional,153 sentencing judges have recently begun to require 
that probationers use reversible methods of birth control such as 
Norplant or Depo-Provera while on probation.154  Commentators have 
argued that forced birth control imposes a reversible “sterilization” 
procedure that is as much an unconstitutional infringement on the 
right to procreate as permanent sterilization.155  These commentators 
assert that the temporal character of the infringement is not the 
relevant consideration, rather the ultimate abridgement of the right 
is the important point.156  Additionally, because the fundamental right 
to procreate survives incarceration and may be infringed upon only 
 
infringement on the basic civil rights of marriage and procreation); Mickle v. 
Henrichs, 262 F. 687, 690-92 (Dist. Ct. Nev. 1918) (invalidating a state constitutional 
provision requiring vasectomies of certain criminals as cruel and unusual 
punishment under the Eighth Amendment); State v. Brown, 326 S.E.2d 410, 410-11 
(S.C. 1985) (invalidating the imposition of a probation condition requiring 
castration as cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment); see also 
Kristyn M. Walker, Judicial Control of Reproductive Freedom: The Use of Norplant as a 
Condition of Probation, 78 IOWA L. REV. 779, 787 (1993) (noting that “no appellate 
court has sustained an order forcing contraception or sterilization as a condition of 
probation”).  An early California case, which upheld a probation condition requiring 
the vasectomy of a probationer as reasonable, People v. Blankenship, 61 P.2d 352 
(Cal. 1936), was later questioned in Dominguez, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 293-94.  In 
Dominguez, the court noted that Blankenship was a “most extreme case” based on “ 
dubious” authority and, therefore, struck a probation condition requiring 
sterilization of the probationer.  Id. 
 151 Horwitz, supra note 100, at 136. 
 152 Id. at 137-38. 
 153 See supra note 148. 
 154 See, e.g., People v. Walsh, 593 N.W.2d 558, 558 (Mich. 1999) (stating that, 
although the court did not reach the issue, a probation condition requiring a 
convicted child abuser to use Depo-Provera or Norplant during her probation was an 
invalid and unlawful restriction) (Corrigan, J., concurring). 
 155 Ballard, supra note 12, at 149-50; see also Walker, supra note 150, at 787. 
 156 Ballard, supra note 12, at 149-50. 
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to the extent necessary to achieve valid penological goals,157 
probationers, who suffer a less serious infringement on their liberty, 
should be afforded at least as much protection as incarcerated 
criminals.158 
Alternatively, some courts have imposed probation conditions 
that preclude a woman from becoming pregnant while on probation 
without requiring the use of any specific contraceptive method.159  
Although supporters of these conditions argue that pregnancy 
prohibitions are necessary to protect children from drug-related birth 
defects and child abuse,160 opponents correctly note that these 
 
 157 See, e.g., Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 84, 94-96 (1987) (striking down a prison 
regulation prohibiting prisoners from marrying without the prison superintendant’s 
permission; noting that, although the right to marry may be subject to restrictions 
resulting from imprisonment, “[p]rison walls do not form a barrier separating prison 
inmates from the protections of the Constitution” and, therefore, a restriction 
implicating constitutional rights would be upheld only “if it is reasonably related to 
legitimate penological interests”); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 523 (1984) 
(stating that prisoners must be “accorded those rights not fundamentally 
inconsistent with imprisonment itself or incompatible with the objectives of 
incarceration”); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 822 (1974) (reiterating that “a 
prison inmate retains those First Amendment rights that are not inconsistent with his 
status as a prisoner or with the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections 
system”); see also Gerber v. Hickman, 264 F.3d 882, 888 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that 
prisoners retain their right to procreate even though incarcerated); Hernandez v. 
Coughlin, 18 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 1994) (noting that both the right to marry and the 
right to procreate survive incarceration, even though those rights may be restricted 
during incarceration); Goodwin v. Turner, 908 F.2d 1395, 1398 (8th Cir. 1990) 
(noting that constitutional rights survive incarceration and may be restricted only 
where necessary to serve valid penological goals). 
 158 See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 12, at 166-67. 
 159 See, e.g., People v. Zaring, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 263 (Cal. Ct. App. 1992) 
(invalidating as overbroad a probation condition requiring that a woman not 
become pregnant for the term of her probation, which was five years); People v. 
Pointer, 199 Cal. Rptr. 357 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) (invaliding as overbroad a probation 
condition for a woman not to become pregnant because less restrictive alternatives 
were available); People v. Dominguez, 64 Cal. Rptr. 290 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) 
(establishing a reasonableness test for probation conditions and invalidating a 
condition requiring that a convicted robber not become pregnant); Rodriguez v. 
State, 378 So. 2d 7 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1979) (invalidating a ten-year probation 
condition prohibiting a woman from becoming pregnant); State v. Mosburg, 768 
P.2d 313 (Kan. Ct. App. 1989) (invalidating a probation condition prohibiting a 
female offender from becoming pregnant as unreasonable and an abuse of 
discretion); State v. Norman, 484 So. 2d 952 (La. Ct. App. 1986) (invalidating a 
probation condition that precluded a convicted forger from becoming pregnant 
unless she was married because the condition was not reasonably related to the 
prevention of future criminality); State v. Livingston, 372 N.E.2d 1335 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1976) (invalidating a probation condition prohibiting a woman from becoming 
pregnant for five years because it was too great an infringement on her fundamental 
right to procreate). 
 160 See, e.g., Janet W. Steverson, Stopping Fetal Abuse with No-Pregnancy and Drug 
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conditions are infringements of the greatest magnitude on personal 
privacy and reproductive freedoms and are often imposed on the 
basis of a trial judge’s own prejudices or personal values rather than 
on the basis of rehabilitation.161  Like forced sterilization, these 
conditions have consistently been invalidated.162  Interestingly, but 
not surprisingly, nearly all of the past rulings and critiques have 
focused on women’s rights and women’s probation conditions.  The 
latest wrinkle in the debate has been the imposition of similar 
conditions on men.163 
IV.  THE PROBLEMS WITH OAKLEY 
David W. Oakley is not a model citizen.  By the time he was 
convicted of felony failure to pay child support,164 he had fathered 
nine children between the ages of three and sixteen with four 
different women and was $25,000 in arrears on his child support 
payments.165  The trial court was convinced that he had intentionally 
failed to make his payments in the past and that he had no intention 
of making his payments in the future.166  At sentencing, the trial judge 
imposed a probation condition prohibiting Oakley from fathering 
 
Treatment Probation Conditions, 34 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 295, 346-47 (1994) (noting, 
however, that a no-pregnancy condition alone is insufficient to achieve these goals 
and proposing that the court must also require birth control either in the form of 
Norplant or a contraceptive of the probationer’s choice). 
 161 See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 12, at 139-141; see also Horwitz, supra note 99, at 
138. 
 162 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 139-42.  Horwitz also notes that while courts have 
invalidated probation conditions, which restrict the fundamental right to procreate, 
the structural barriers inherent in appealing these conditions suggest that the rates 
at which these conditions are imposed, yet unchallenged, is high.  Id. 
 163 See United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960 (8th Cir. 1992) (invalidating a 
probation condition prohibiting a man from fathering more children until he could 
prove that he could provide for his current children because it was not reasonably 
related to the drug offense for which he was convicted and less restrictive alternatives 
existed); Howland v. Florida, 420 So. 2d 918 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982) (vacating a 
probation condition that prohibited a father convicted of child abuse from fathering 
more children while on probation); State v. Oakley, 629 N.W.2d 200 (Wis. 2001).  It 
is not that the protection of the right to procreate differs based on gender, but 
rather, that these conditions (or challenges) are relatively new and they implicate 
issues of privacy and practical enforcement.  See infra notes 198-207. 
 164 Oakley was a repeat offender; he had previously been convicted of witness 
intimidation.  Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 202. 
 165 Id. 
 166 Justice Wilcox’s opinion for the majority quotes the sentencing judge, Judge 
Hazlewood, as noting, “If Mr. Oakley had paid something, had made an earnest 
effort to pay anything within his remote ability to pay, we wouldn’t be sitting here,” 
and further quotes Judge Hazlewood as characterizing Oakley’s arrears as “obvious, 
consistent and inexcusable.”  Id. at 202-03. 
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children during his five-year probationary term unless he could prove 
that he was capable of supporting his nine children and any 
additional children.167  Oakley’s neglect of his parental 
responsibilities raises serious questions regarding his children’s needs 
and the pressures placed on the women raising them.  However, as 
critics of the majority’s opinion have noted, “hard cases make bad 
law,”168 and a determination that Oakley failed to pay child support 
does not automatically lead to the conclusion that he should lose his 
constitutional right to have children.  State v. Oakley provides an 
example not only of the difficulties probationers face in challenging 
the terms of their probation, but also of the need for strict scrutiny 
review of probation conditions that implicate fundamental rights. 
First, the Oakley decision appears to rely on the discredited “act 
of grace” doctrine.169  Justice Wilcox’s majority opinion stated that 
“because Oakley was convicted of [a felony, he] could have been 
imprisoned for six years, which would have eliminated his right to 
procreate altogether . . . [therefore], this probation condition, which 
infringes on his right to procreate during his term of probation, is 
not invalid under these facts.”170  While the court avoided using words 
such as “act of grace” or “privilege,” the underlying message is clear—
Oakley’s probation was a gift.171  As discussed previously, the act of 
grace doctrine has been repudiated as a means of rejecting 
challenges to probation restrictions.172  Oakley has a constitutionally 
protected right to procreate and the court should not have dismissed 
Oakley’s challenge to his probation condition so quickly or easily. 
Not only is Justice Wilcox’s statement troubling in its reliance on 
the act of grace doctrine, it is also inaccurate.173  Had Oakley been 
incarcerated, he would not have entirely lost his right to procreate; 
his right would have been limited only to the extent necessary to 
meet valid penological goals.174  Noting this inaccuracy, the dissent 
stated, “[Oakley] is a probationer and has retained a degree of his 
liberty, including ‘a significant degree of privacy under the Fourth, 
 
 167 Id. at 203. 
 168 Berger, supra note 1, at A21. 
 169 Supra notes 93-100, 104-09 and accompanying text. 
 170 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02. 
 171 Id. 
 172 Judicial Review, supra note 102, at 202 (noting that the “assumptions upon 
which the act of grace theory rests have been shown to be unsound and the doctrine 
can no longer serve to immunize probation conditions from constitutional 
controls”). 
 173 See supra note 157. 
 174 Id. 
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Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments.’  While the State has chosen not 
to exercise control over Oakley’s body by incarcerating him, it does 
not necessarily follow that the State may then opt to exercise 
unlimited control over his right to procreate.”175  Because the 
functions of probation, protecting society and rehabilitating 
offenders, require some restrictions on offenders, probationers 
cannot expect to retain the same freedoms and rights as individuals 
not convicted of crimes.176  However, to state that Oakley would have 
lost his right to procreate completely is an untenable position in light 
of the jurisprudence established by the United States Supreme Court 
regarding prisoners’ rights.177 
Second, courts should review this type of probation restriction 
with strict scrutiny and such a review demands that the condition be 
invalidated. The need for strict scrutiny is clear: not only does such a 
review protect individual rights, but it also helps to remove from the 
criminal justice system the “personal biases, stereotypes and 
prejudices” that individual judges may include in their decision 
making. 178  Strict scrutiny review requires judges to impose conditions 
that have been narrowly tailored to meet the compelling 
governmental objectives of rehabilitating offenders while protecting 
public safety.179  Under this rubric, Oakley’s probation condition is 
unconstitutional.  There is no doubt that the right to procreate is 
fundamental.180  It is also clear that the probation condition 
prohibiting Oakley from fathering children for the term of his 
probation infringes upon that right.  Strict scrutiny requires that the 
state’s imposition of the condition be narrowly tailored to achieve 
compelling goals.181 
There is no dispute that the state has a compelling interest in 
the instant case.182  Indeed, Justice Bradley’s dissent echoed the 
majority’s position that there is a compelling state interest in 
requiring parents to support their children not only to provide for 
the individual child’s needs, but also to prevent greater societal 
 
 175 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
 176 See Judicial Review, supra note 102, at 202. 
 177 See supra note 157. 
 178 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 162. 
 179 Id. 
 180 See supra notes 8-39 and accompanying text. 
 181 See supra note 13. 
 182 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216, 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Palmore v. 
Sidoti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984) (stating that “[t]he state, of course, has a duty of the 
highest order to protect the interests of minor children, particularly those of tender 
years”). 
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problems such as poverty, poor educational attainment, and poor 
health among the nation’s children.183  Justice Bradley’s dissent 
clearly explicates, however, that the state had other means at its 
disposal, more narrowly tailored and available by statute to better 
ensure the payment of support to Oakley’s children.184  The court 
could have required that Oakley remain employed, that he hold two 
jobs, that his wages be assigned, that his tax refunds be intercepted, 
that liens be taken on his property, that he be found in civil 
contempt, or that he be prosecuted for “any additional intentional 
failures to support his children, present or future.”185  Justice Bradley 
appropriately placed the burden on the state to show that when it 
acts to infringe upon a liberty interest it does so with the least 
intrusive means possible.186  Although the court may have been 
concerned that Oakley would not be swayed by these options, the 
dissent correctly noted that that inference is insufficient to impose an 
overly broad infringement on his right to procreate.187  Ultimately, 
the condition clearly fails to survive strict scrutiny. 
Additionally, by failing to apply strict scrutiny and upholding the 
probation condition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court became the first 
court in the United States to “declare constitutional a condition that 
limits a probationer’s right to procreate based on his financial ability 
to support his children,” and wrote a decision that may “affect the 
rights of every citizen of this state, man or woman, rich or poor.”188  
The Supreme Court’s decision in Zablocki v. Redhail189 suggests that 
such a condition is indeed unconstitutional.190  In Zablocki, the 
Supreme Court invalidated a Wisconsin statute that prohibited 
individuals from marrying until they had proven that they had met 
their child support obligations.191  Although the right to marry and 
the right to procreate are not the same, Justice Bradley argued in 
dissent that they are closely aligned, an argument that is consistent 
 
 183 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 216 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 184 Id. at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (noting that under Wisconsin law, the court 
could have chosen to garnish Oakley’s wages, place a lien on his personal property or 
hold him in civil contempt if he chose not to honor his obligations). 
 185 Id. at 222 (Sykes, J., dissenting). 
 186 Id. at 217 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 312 
(1980); Carey, 431 U.S. at 684-85; Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972)). 
 187 Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (stating that “[s]uch an inference does not a 
constitutional justification make”). 
 188 Id. at 216. 
 189 434 U.S. 374 (1978). 
 190 Id. at 388-91. 
 191 Id. 
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with prior Supreme Court cases.192  Justice Bradley expressed concern 
regarding a “judicially-imposed ‘credit check’” on the right to bear 
children,193 and characterized the majority’s decision as “imbue[ing] 
a fundamental liberty interest with a sliding scale of wealth.”194  Justice 
Bradley noted further that “[m]en and women in America are free to 
have children, as many as they desire.  They may do so without the 
means to support the children and may later suffer legal 
consequences as a result of that inability to provide support.  
However, the right to have a child has never been rationed on the 
basis of wealth.”195 
Third, even under a less-exacting reasonableness or reasonable 
relation review, it is unclear that prohibiting Oakley from having 
more children will aid his rehabilitation or protect the public.  
Oakley’s crime is felony failure to pay child support—his probation 
condition does nothing to ensure that he supports his current 
children.  Preventing Oakley from having additional children does 
not compel him to provide for his present children.196  If anything, 
the condition is likely to make it more difficult for Oakley to support 
his children because if he fathers another child (a circumstance that 
could arise even if he uses birth control in his future sexual 
encounters), he will be incarcerated.197 
Finally, the Oakley decision illustrates the complex policy 
considerations surrounding appellate review of probation conditions 
and underscores the need for more exacting review of probation 
conditions when they are challenged.198  While the bulk of challenges 
to probation conditions have come from women,199 the imposition of 
similar conditions on male probationers does not change the analysis 
regarding the unconstitutionality of infringement on procreative 
rights—rather, this case highlights the new practical hurdles and 
 
 192 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 218 (Bradley, J., dissenting); see also Zablocki, 434 U.S. at 
374; Skinner, 316 U.S. at 541 (stating that “[m]arriage and procreation are 
fundamental to the very existence and survival of the race”). 
 193 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 194 Id. at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 195 Id.(Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 196 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 201-02. 
 197 This possibility was noted by the trial judge as a factor in his decision to impose 
probation instead of incarceration; Judge Hazelwood noted that “if Mr. Oakley goes 
to prison, he’s not going to be in a position to pay any meaningful support for these 
children.”  Id. at 203. 
 198 Horwitz, supra note 99, at 81-85, 154 (noting that challenges to probation 
conditions are not common and, therefore, many unconstitutional conditions may 
go unchecked). 
 199 Id. at 136-41; see also supra note 155. 
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policy concerns raised when these restrictions are placed on men.  
This probation condition cannot be enforced.  There is no means to 
prevent Oakley from engaging in sexual intercourse and certainly no 
means to ensure that he does so responsibly.200  One must ask how a 
court can monitor the restriction prohibiting a male probationer 
from fathering children—unlike female probationers, who can be 
given pregnancy tests by their probation officers, there is no similar 
test for men.  Additionally, there is no Norplant or Depo-Provera 
birth control equivalent for men.201  Further, the probation condition 
will not be violated until a woman gives birth to a child,202 so arguably 
Oakley could follow all the terms of his probation until 8 months 
before the end of his term and then father numerous children who 
will not be born until after the term expires.  This allows Oakley to 
stay within the letter of this probation condition even as he violates its 
spirit.  In fact, in 1992, the Eight Circuit noted these problems when 
it found a similar probation condition unworkable: 
Short of having a probation officer follow [the probationer] 
twenty-four hours a day, there is no way to prevent [him] from 
fathering more children.  If [he] were to violate this condition of 
his probation, he may well be returned to prison, leaving him no 
way to provide for his dependents.  This certainly would not serve 
the district court’s goal of “adequately support[ing] and 
sustain[ing]” [the probationers] children.203 
By deferring to the trial court and applying a minimal reasonableness 
analysis to Oakley’s probation condition, the Wisconsin Supreme 
Court failed to give appropriate weight to these difficulties and 
allowed far too great an imposition on Oakley’s fundamental right to 
procreate. 
A final policy concern is that imposing probation conditions 
prohibiting fathering or giving birth to children may be “coercive of 
abortion.”204  While past cases have raised this concern regarding 
 
 200 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 201 But see People v. Gauntlett, 352 N.W.2d 310 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (invalidating 
a probation condition for a male sex-offender requiring that he receive Depo-
Provera injections). 
 202 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 220 (Bradley, J., dissenting). 
 203 United States v. Smith, 972 F.2d 960, 962 (8th Cir. 1992). 
 204 Oakley, 629 N.W.2d at 219 (Bradley, J., dissenting) (citing People v. Pointer, 
199 Cal. Rptr. 357, 366 (Cal. Ct. App. 1984) in which the court invalidated a 
probation condition prohibiting a female probationer from conceiving and raising 
fears that if she became pregnant while on probation, she might seek an abortion to 
avoid going to prison); see also State v. Mosburg, 768 P.2d 313, 315 (Kan. Ct. App. 
1989). 
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female probationers,205 the fear of coerced abortion looms just as 
large where conditions are placed on men.  If a male probationer 
impregnates a woman and realizes that having done so he will be sent 
to prison, his incentive is high to demand that that woman terminate 
her pregnancy.206  It also places the woman in a terrible bind: she can 
choose to have an abortion or see the father of her child go to prison.  
In the latter case, the woman is then forced to raise and support the 
child on her own and grapple with any psychological repercussions 
should she feel responsible for the defendant’s incarceration.207  Such 
collateral consequences of probation restrictions again highlight the 
need for narrowly tailored restrictions designed to rehabilitate 
offenders and to protect the public. 
CONCLUSION 
State v. Oakley presents the stark difficulties inherent in balancing 
individual freedoms with state needs, specifically the tug-of-war 
between individual reproductive rights and the rights of children to 
be financially supported by both of their parents.  Yet, simply because 
countervailing considerations make arriving at the correct decision 
difficult, courts cannot abdicate their responsibility to protect 
constitutional rights.  Appellate courts must review probation 
conditions that infringe upon constitutional rights with strict scrutiny 
both to protect individual rights and to curb the inclusion of 
prejudice, bias, and personal values in probation restrictions.  Strict 
scrutiny allows trial judges to be creative while precluding the 
imposition of overly harsh punitive probation restrictions.  Although 
these restrictions may satisfy a simplistic notion of getting tough on 
crime, they fail to protect probationers’ constitutional rights and also 
fail to further the rehabilitative goals of probation.  Appellate review 
provides a check upon trial courts only when that review is truly 
substantive and not simply a rubber stamp; it is time for appellate 
courts to begin reigning in the immense discretion of trial courts and 
insist that probation conditions infringing upon the fundamental 
right to procreate survive strict scrutiny. 
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